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Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 
the Court of First Instance of 17 September 2007.
1. Introduction
The recent, long-awaited and high-proﬁ le, CFI judgment in the case of Micro-
soft – which was not appealed to the ECJ1 – represents a victory for the Com-
mission’s approach to the application of the EC competition rules to dominant 
companies operating on high technology markets. It is extremely signiﬁ cant 
for the application of Article 82 EC to refusals to disclose technological stan-
dards covered by intellectual property rights regarded by competitors as “in-
dispensable” to operate on the market. Moreover, it reafﬁ rms the existing case 
law governing tying, without, however, directly addressing the speciﬁ c issues 
raised by cases of technological integration in a market characterized by net-
work and learning effects.2
Initiated in 2001, the Commission’s case against Microsoft added to the 
antitrust scrutiny under which that company had been for a number of years in 
the US. Central to the bundle of allegations made by the US Department of 
Justice was that Microsoft’s tying of its own internet browser (Internet Ex-
plorer) to the Windows PC operating system (hereinafter: “OS”) would have 
allowed it to extend its monopoly power on the OS market to that for internet 
browsers, to the detriment of existing competitors.3 Although this case was 
eventually settled out of court, the decision of the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals4 was extremely signiﬁ cant since it advocated a move from the 
“modiﬁ ed per se approach” hitherto applicable to unlawful tying under Section 
1 of the Sherman Act5 to the application of a “rule of reason” standard.6 The 
court justiﬁ ed its stance in the light of the need to take into proper account the 
“sui generis” nature of the software market and especially the consumer ben-
1. See also “Commission welcomes CFI ruling upholding Commission’s decision on Micro-
soft’s abuse of dominant market position”, 17 Sept. 2007, MEMO 07/359.
2. Inter alia, Geier, United States v. Microsoft Corporation, 16 Berk. Tech. L. J. (2001), 297 
at 302.
3. Inter alia, Apon, “Cases against Microsoft: similar cases, different remedies”, 28 ECLR 
(2007), 327 at 327–328.
4. US v. Microsoft, (1998) 147 F. 3d 935.
5. See, inter alia, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 et al. v. Hyde, (1984) 466 US 2, 
104 S. Ct. 1551, pp. 1556–1558.
6. US v. Microsoft, (1998) 147 F. 3d 935, pp. 950–951.
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eﬁ ts stemming from the technological integration of new features in an OS, 
albeit a dominant one.7
In the EU, the Commission started proceedings in respect of two distinct 
allegations of anti-competitive conduct. First, a number of Microsoft’s com-
petitors complained that, by refusing to disclose sufﬁ cient interface informa-
tion to independent producers of workgroup server OS, Microsoft had been 
pursuing a strategy to drive them out of that market by exploiting its near mo-
nopoly on the PC OS market. And second, Microsoft was accused of having 
illegally tied its Windows Media Player software to its dominant PC OS and, 
consequently, due to its overwhelming dominance on the PC OS market, of 
leveraging its dominant position to the market for media player software. It 
was alleged that by offering WMP pre-installed on all Windows-operated PCs, 
which accounted for above 95 percent of worldwide machines, Microsoft was 
availing itself of a privileged channel of distribution for its media player facil-
ity which was not available to its competitors on the media player market. As 
a result, it was restricting the freedom of choice of consumers as to which 
media player to employ, with detrimental effects for competing software pro-
viders.8 
The case was considered of utmost importance, due to the strategic role of 
the market for operating systems in the development of a global market for 
information technology and e-commerce. Speaking about the allegations made 
against Microsoft, the then Commissioner for Competition, Mario Monti, stat-
ed:
“Server networks lie at the heart of the future of the Web and every effort 
must be made to prevent their monopolisation through illegal practices. 
The Commission also wants to see undistorted competition in the market 
for media players. These products will not only revolutionise the way peo-
ple listen to music or watch videos but will also play an important role 
with a view to making Internet content and electronic commerce more at-
tractive. The Commission is determined to ensure that the Internet remains 
a competitive marketplace to the beneﬁ t of innovation and consumers 
alike.” 9 
The Commissioner’s statements, made at the time administrative proceedings 
were started, demonstrated the strong willingness of the EU authorities to keep 
a “watchful eye” on Microsoft so as to prevent its dominance on the PC OS 
7. Id., pp. 951–952, 954. See also US v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, pp. 96–97.
8. “Commission opens proceedings against Microsoft’s alleged discriminatory licensing and 
refusal to supply software information”, Press Release IP/00/906, 3 Aug. 2000.
9. “Commission initiates additional proceedings against Microsoft”, Press release IP/01/1232, 
30 Aug. 2001.
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market extending to neighbouring markets and therefore dampening any exist-
ing competition in the IT industry.10
After a brief outline of the Commission Decision, this case note will exam-
ine the judgment of the CFI in Microsoft. With respect to the refusal to license 
interoperability information, it will be shown that the CFI judgment raises 
relevant questions concerning the interpretation of the condition that the infor-
mation be “indispensable”, the “new product” requirement and the concept of 
“objective justiﬁ cation”.11 Having regard to the assessment of abusive tying, 
this note will argue that the CFI’s approach appears to have overlooked the 
circumstance that Windows Media Player could “co-exist” with software sup-
plied by Microsoft’s competitors and performing the same function, and will 
suggest that this approach may not be entirely suitable to the assessment of 
forms of technological integration that are commonplace in new economy 
markets. In conclusion, the case note will assess the more general issue of 
whether the position adopted in the judgment constitutes the appropriate re-
sponse to the need to foster innovation and thus to provide better-quality prod-
ucts to the beneﬁ t of consumers in high technology markets.
2. Factual and legal background: the Microsoft decision
The 2004 Microsoft decision12 has been widely debated13 and the limited scope 
of this work does not allow for its detailed consideration. The Commission 
found that ﬁ rstly, Microsoft had unlawfully refused to disclose – or, more ac-
curately, had stopped disclosing14 – interoperability information to indepen-
dent suppliers on the separate market for work-group server OS; secondly, it 
10. Apon, op. cit. supra note 3, at 336.
11. Cf. Case C-418/01, IMS Health Co GmbH & Co v. NDC Health GmbH & Co KG, [2004] 
ECR I-5039. For commentary, see, inter alia, Ong, “Building brick barricades and other barriers 
to entry: abusing a dominant position by refusing to licence intellectual property rights”, 26 
ECLR (2005) 215.
12. Commission Decision of 24 March 2004, notiﬁ ed under document number C (2004)900, 
Case COMP/C-3/37.792 – Microsoft, Decision 2007/53/EC, O.J. 2007, C 32/23. This Decision 
as published in the O.J. includes only a summary of the infringement, remedies and ﬁ nes. A non-
conﬁ dential version of the full text is available through the Commission website.
13. See, inter alia, Pardolesi and Renda, “The European Commission’s case against Micro-
soft: Kill Bill?”, 27 W. Comp. (2004), 513; Leveque, “Innovation, leveraging and essential fa-
cilities: Interoperability licensing in the EU Microsoft case”, 28 W. Comp. (2005), 72; Gerardin, 
“Limiting the scope of Article 82: what can the EU learn from the US Supreme Court’s judg-
ment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deutsche Telekom?”, 41 CML Rev., (2004) , 
1519. Cf. Vezzoso, “The incentives balance test in the EU Microsoft case: a pro-innovation”, 
economic-based approach?”, 27 ECLR (2006), 382.
14. Commission Decision, supra note 12, paras. 573–75; see also paras. 578–583.
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had illegally tied its Windows Media Player facility (hereinafter: “WMP”) to 
its operating system and, as a result of the ubiquity of its Windows OS, had 
impeded independent manufacturers of analogous software to enter into and 
viably compete on the market. (Decision, paras. 793 et seq. and 844–848).
With respect to the refusal to disclose interoperability information, the 
Commission argued that, given Microsoft’s dominance on both the PC operat-
ing and the work group server OS market and the “strong commercial and 
technical associative links” between the two markets, the refusal to provide 
the necessary information to design compatible work group server OS with 
Window’s own architecture for network servers risked eliminating competi-
tion from that market by preventing independent software providers develop-
ing software that could “seamlessly integrate” with Microsoft-run servers (De-
cision paras. 541, 572, 586, 665, 692–694). 
As regards the allegation of abusive tying, the Commission rejected the 
view that bundling WMP with Microsoft Windows OS constituted a case of 
technological integration giving rise to a “new product” and found that, by 
doing so, Microsoft had attempted to extend its near-monopoly position on the 
market for PC OS to the neighbouring market for media players. Although 
WMP was available to customers at no extra charge and individual users could 
choose not to run the application and instead employ a competing media play-
er, the mere fact that Windows OS was not available “unbundled” amounted 
to “coercing” “customers or suppliers of complementary software and con-
tent” into adopting WMP “at the expense of competing unbundled products” 
(Decision paras. 803–806, 811, 830–832). The Commission concluded that, 
because of the ubiquity of Microsoft’s OS, WMP would become the “platform 
of choice for complementary content and applications”, without any counter-
vailing competitive restraint (Decision paras. 843–844, 860–866). As a result, 
it imposed a ﬁ ne of Euro 497 million on Microsoft and, in order to bring the 
infringement to an end, ordered it to disclose to its competitors the interoper-
ability information necessary for the supply of compatible work group server 
OS (paras. 998 et seq.). It also required the company to offer an “unbundled” 
version of Windows, i.e. a version of the OS without its own media player 
(paras. 1011 et seq.).15 
To oversee compliance with these obligations, the Commission desired the 
appointment of a “Monitoring Trustee”, chosen from a list of potential candi-
dates suggested by Microsoft and subject to requirements regarding ability to 
discharge the functions outlined in the Commission’s mandate (Decision, para 
1043 et seq.). The Trustee was to be primarily responsible for issuing opinions 
15. See also “Commission concludes on Microsoft investigation, imposes conduct remedies 
and a ﬁ ne”, Press Release IP/04/382, 24 March 2004.
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on whether Microsoft had fulﬁ lled its obligations under the Decision, either 
proprio motu or upon request from the Commission or from a third party. He 
was also entrusted with dealing with individual complaints as far as possible 
informally or through an ad hoc procedure.16 To discharge his tasks the Trustee 
enjoyed the power to obtain access to documents retained by Microsoft, which 
would be under a duty to cooperate with these inquiries, unless it believed that 
handling conﬁ dential information would adversely affect its legitimate inter-
ests.17 It was incumbent on Microsoft to ﬁ nance the establishment and the 
functioning of the Monitoring Trustee, whereas the Commission oversaw the 
Trustee’s compliance with its Mandate and Work Plan.18
The 2004 Decision attracted signiﬁ cant criticism.19 Microsoft brought an 
application against the Decision, and also lodged an interim application seek-
ing the suspension of its effects.20 The interim application failed on the basis 
of lack of “urgency”, but the CFI already highlighted key issues for reconsid-
eration at the merits stage, such as whether the interoperability information 
sought by Microsoft’s competitors could be considered “indispensable”, 
whether the refusal to disclose it could prevent the emergence of a “new prod-
uct”, as outlined by the relevant case law, and whether the requirement of 
“objective justiﬁ cation had been established by the applicant. 21 As regards the 
allegation of abusive tying, the interim order appeared to be sceptical of the 
Commission’s conclusions that, given the “indirect network effects” charac-
terizing the industry, the market for media player would eventually “tip” in 
favour of WMP.22 
The judgment on the merits emerged as a turning point not only because it 
tests the approach adopted by the Commission vis-à-vis the allegations against 
Microsoft, but also for its implications for more general issues concerning the 
interpretation of Article 82 EC as regards refusal to license and tying.
16. Commission Decision of 28 July 2005, C(2005) 2988 ﬁ nal, paras. 23–25.
17. Id., para 33.
18. Id., para 32.
19. See e.g. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13, at 514; Appeldoorn, “He who 
spareth his rod, spareth his son? Microsoft, super-dominance and Article 82 EC”, 26 ECLR 
(2005), 653 at 655–656; Arts and McCurdy, “The European Commission’s media player remedy 
in its Microsoft decision: compulsory code removal despite the absence of tying or foreclos-
ure?”, 25 ECLR (2004) 694 at 703–705.
20. Case T-201/04 R, Microsoft v. Commission, [2004] ECR II-4663, paras. 71–72.
21. Id., paras. 248 et seq.; paras. 406 et seq.; paras. 206–207; paras. 212–213.
22. Id. paras. 206–207.
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3. The CFI judgment
3.1. The remedy and the ﬁ ne imposed on Microsoft
Before examining the CFI’s judgment of September 2007 as to the competi-
tion law infringements involved, we address, albeit brieﬂ y, the Court’s assess-
ment of the remedies demanded by the Commission, in particular the monitor-
ing mechanism and the ﬁ ne imposed. On this point, it is noteworthy that, 
whereas the CFI conﬁ rmed the amount of the ﬁ nancial penalty, it quashed the 
part of the Decision providing for the establishment, functioning and ﬁ nancing 
of the Trustee.23 According to the CFI, the Commission retained the power to 
oversee compliance with its antitrust decisions and ensure their full and timely 
implementation, if necessary by relying on an independent expert. However, 
the CFI held that by conferring on the Monitoring Trustee a “proactive role” in 
fulﬁ lling his tasks, and especially by entrusting him/her with an independent 
role beyond that of reporting to the Commission, the Commission had over-
stepped the limits of its powers under Council Regulation No 17/62.24 
The CFI pointed out that the Commission lacked the authority to delegate 
to the Trustee powers of investigation akin to those it enjoyed under Regula-
tion 17 and to impose on Microsoft the ﬁ nancial burden associated with the 
monitoring of the compliance with the Decision. The Court took the view that 
it would be inconsistent with the responsibility of the Commission to ensure 
the implementation of the EC antitrust rule “to depend on … the willingness 
or the capacity of the addressee of the decision to bear such costs.”25 Accord-
ingly, it concluded that the Commission had exceeded its powers of investiga-
tion and enforcement in ordering the appointment of the Monitoring Trustee 
equipped with independent, ad hoc powers of investigation and decision-mak-
ing, ﬁ nanced by the applicant.
Commentators have argued that this outcome illustrated the inherent difﬁ -
culties arising from the monitoring by the Commission and, more generally, 
by antitrust enforcement agencies, of “behavioural commitments”.26 Although 
in this case Microsoft did not appeal against the CFI judgment and agreed to 
take practical steps in implementing the obligations imposed on it by the 
Commission,27 if similar issues arise in future cases, the Commission is likely 
23. Judgment, paras. 1326–1365.
24. Judgment, paras. 1265, 1269–1270. That Regulation is now replaced by Reg. 1/2003.
25. Id., para 1275.
26. Howarth and Macmahon, “Windows has performed an illegal operation: the Court of 
First Instance’s judgment in Microsoft v. Commission”, 29 ECLR (2008), 117 at 132.
27. “Antitrust: Commission ensures compliance with 2004 decision against Microsoft”, 
Press Release IP/07/1567, 22 Oct. 2007.
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to look for other options to ensure the oversight of compliance with its deci-
sions.28 
3.2. The characteristics of the software market: brief remarks
Although a detailed examination of their features is beyond the scope of this 
paper, some of the characteristics of high-technology markets deserve speciﬁ c 
attention. In this respect, sufﬁ ce it to say that the market for the supply of soft-
ware is characterized by the presence of “high direct and indirect network ef-
fects” and by a resulting trend toward the emergence of a dominant product 
which will constitute for a time the “de facto standard” in that industry.29 Since 
software programmes, by their very nature, do not function in isolation but are 
designed to interact with other software,30 “the utility that a user derives from 
the consumption” of a particular programme is destined to increase with the 
number of its users.31 Consequently, it has been argued that the wide accep-
tance of a particular programme will inevitably result in that product becom-
ing entrenched as the format of choice for end users in a particular market.32 
According to the 4th Circuit of the US Court of Appeals in Re: Microsoft 
Antitrust Litigation,33 in a market characterized by network effects, the share 
held by a supplier is destined to expand due to a “feedback effect”, resulting 
from the circumstance that “the attractiveness of a product to consumers in-
creases with the number of persons using it”.34 Consequently, due to the ever-
expanding customer base, users will adopt the “entrenched” programme as 
their “interface of choice”. And software developers, on the other side, will 
“opt to write application software” in that format, in order to reach the broad-
est possible “audience”, thus eventually excluding any competing formats 
from the relevant market: this is what is termed “tipping”.35
28. Howarth and Macmahon, op. cit. supra note 26, at 132.
29. Montagnani, “Remedies to exclusionary innovation in the high-tech sector: s there a les-
son from the Microsoft saga?”, 30 W. Comp. (2007), 623 at 625.
30. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13, at 526–527.
31. Montagnani, op. cit. supra note 29, at 625.
32. Ibid.
33. In re: Microsoft Corporation Antitrust Litigation – Sun Microsystem Inc v. Microsoft, 
333 F. 3rd 517.
34. Per curiam, p. 521, note 1.
35. Ibid. For commentary, see, inter alia, Montagnani, op. cit. supra note 29, at 625.
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3.3. Preliminary issues
Before addressing the content of the Commission Decision and the applicants’ 
arguments, the CFI made some remarks on the scope of the judicial scrutiny it 
should exercise. It held that a “comprehensive review” would have to be car-
ried out only as regards the “question as to whether or not the conditions for 
the application of the competition rules are met”, and stated that it would lim-
it the “review of complex economic appraisals made by the Commission” to 
examining whether the relevant rules of procedure and on stating reasons have 
been complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and wheth-
er there has been any manifest error or assessment or a misuse of powers” 
(para 87). In the light of the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Commis-
sion in respect of “technical matters”, it would focus its scrutiny on whether 
the evidence adduced was “accurate, reliable and consistent”, provided for “all 
the relevant data” and was “capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn 
from it” (paras. 88, 89).36
The CFI thus clearly deﬁ ned the scope of its powers of review in accor-
dance with the principles enshrined in the existing case law on judicial review 
in antitrust matters.37 The ECJ had earlier afﬁ rmed, in Remia, that in apprais-
ing “complex economic matters”, that Court would limit its scrutiny to “wheth-
er the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the state-
ment of the reasons … is adequate, whether the facts have been accurately 
stated and whether there has been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse 
of powers.”38
3.3. “Compatible” or “cloned”? The obligation to disclose interoperability
 protocols
When it came to the questions of substance, the CFI examined, ﬁ rst of all, 
whether the applicant’s refusal to disclose the interconnection protocols to its 
competitors on the work group server OS market constituted an abuse of its 
dominant position and addressed the degree of interoperability required to en-
sure effective competition (para 229). It stated that “indissociable” links ex-
isted between client/client and client/server interoperability protocols in the 
context of Microsoft’s own network architecture (para 231). Accordingly, it 
36. For commentary, see, inter alia, Howarth and Macmahon, op. cit. supra note 26, at 
133–134.
37. See e.g. Case 42/84, Remia BV v. Commission, [1985] ECR 2545; Joined Cases 142 & 
156/84, British American Tobacco and RJ Reynolds v. Commission, [1987] ECR 4487; also, 
Case C-12/03 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval BV, [2005] ECR I-987, para 38.
38. Remia, previous footnote, para 34.
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held that competing software providers should obtain access to both sets of 
protocols to be able to offer an OS that can “interoperate with Windows do-
main architecture on equal footing” with work-group servers operated by Mi-
crosoft OS (paras. 230, 237). The CFI denied that so wide an obligation would 
allow the emergence of competing “clones” of the dominant work group serv-
er OS, as claimed by Microsoft (para 212). It took the different view that the 
information in question was limited to the interconnection protocols and did 
not extend to Microsoft’s “source codes”, i.e. those speciﬁ cations which would 
allow other software suppliers to develop software governed by the same “log-
ic” as that of Microsoft’s OS (paras. 241, 259–260). 
The Court then examined whether Microsoft’s refusal to disclose that infor-
mation, on the ground that it was covered by copyright, constituted abusive 
behaviour (paras. 310, 312). As a general point, it held that, although in prin-
ciple dominant undertakings are free to choose their business partners and 
especially to decide whether and to whom to grant a licence to use input cov-
ered by their intellectual property rights, there may be “exceptional circum-
stances” in which a refusal to license could constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position (para 319). 
The CFI stated that in accordance with the existing case law,39 such “excep-
tional circumstances would involve a refusal to grant a licence” which con-
cerned a product “the supply of which was indispensable to the exercise” of a 
business activity and prevented the appearance of a new product that was not 
currently supplied and for which potential consumer demand existed (para 
324). Once the Commission had established that these requirements were met, 
the denial of a licence would therefore constitute an abuse of a dominant posi-
tion unless it could be objectively justiﬁ ed. It was noted, in particular, that the 
“new product” condition had only been applied to cases regarding the exercise 
of IP rights (paras. 333, 334).
In relation to the requirement of ”indispensability”, the CFI recalled that, in 
the light of its limited powers of scrutiny of the Commission’s assessment of 
“complex economic matters”, its review would be limited to verifying wheth-
er the Commission had made a manifest error in concluding that the availabil-
ity of the interoperability information was “indispensable” for the suppliers of 
competing work group server OS to remain viable on the market, namely, it 
was an element of “signiﬁ cant competitive importance” for undertakings ac-
tive on this market ( paras. 369 et seq., 381).40 
39. See e.g. Case 238/87, VOLVO v. Veng, [1988] ECR I-6211; Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91 
P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, [1995] ECR I-743; Case C-7/97, BronnerGmbH & Co v. Medi-
aprint, [1998] ECR I-7791. 
40. See e.g. Bronner, previous note, para 47.
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The Court held that, contrary to Microsoft’s assertions, the ﬁ ndings of the 
Commission were accurate. It pointed to a number of factors, such as the na-
ture of computer software as a product “designed to communicate with other 
computer programmes and hardware”, especially in network environments, 
and the exceptional nature of Microsoft’s dominant position on the PC OS 
market (paras. 382, 383, 387). In the light of the “extraordinary features” of 
the case, it was concluded that the ability of non-Microsoft work group OS to 
“participate in the Windows domain architecture … on an equal footing” with 
Windows-operated machines was essential to ensure their viability and their 
attractiveness to consumers (paras. 389–390). The Court stated that due to the 
“privileged links” between the client PC and the server OS, Microsoft would 
be able to impose its own domain architecture as “the de facto standard for 
work group computing” and, as a result, the absence of interoperability would 
eventually reinforce Microsoft’s dominant position to the detriment of its 
competitors (paras. 392, 422). 
The additional circumstance that the more an OS became established on the 
market as the dominant one, the easier it would be for users to ﬁ nd appropri-
ately skilled support and assistance for it, because technicians will be inevita-
bly more inclined to develop the skills necessary to support a “popular system” 
constituted a factor increasing the “lock-in” effect on users.41 The CFI took the 
view that the downward trend characterizing the market shares of Microsoft’s 
competitors in the period following Microsoft’s refusal to supply the interop-
erability protocols demonstrated that customers had been in fact discouraged 
from “switching” to competing OS and that this, in turn, had strengthened 
Microsoft’s position (paras. 567–68, 580, 587, 591, 592–593, 618).
The Court went on to examine whether Microsoft’s refusal to license the 
interoperability protocols prevented the emergence of a “new product” cur-
rently not offered by the owner of the IP right (para 621 et seq.).42 After recall-
ing that this requirement could only be found in the case law concerning the 
refusal to license IP rights, the CFI rejected Microsoft’s argument that “the 
addition of a feature taken from a competitor’s product” did not amount to the 
creation of a “new product” and held: 
“In the balancing of the interest in protection of the IP right and the eco-
nomic freedom of its owner against the interest to the protection of free 
competition the latter can prevail only when the refusal to grant a licence 
prevents the development of a secondary market.” (para 646) 
41. Judgment para 619. For commentary, see Ong, op. cit. supra note 11 at 222 and 224.
42. See, e.g. IMS Health, supra note 11, para 49.
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That would be the case, according to the CFI, not only when the refusal pre-
vented the emergence of a novel product, namely one which “although in com-
petition with those of the owner of the right, answers speciﬁ c consumer re-
quirements not satisﬁ ed by existing goods or services”,43 but also when it 
merely hampered technical development (para 647). 
In the light of the above, the CFI concluded that the Commission had not 
reached an erroneous conclusion in stating that Microsoft’s refusal to disclose 
interoperability information had prevented its competitors from developing 
sufﬁ ciently compatible workgroup server OS, with a detrimental impact both 
on competition, since its conduct had impeded the emergence of competing 
products, and on consumer welfare, since users’ preferences had been “chan-
nelled” toward the dominant software, although customers regarded non-Mi-
crosoft OS as “better alternatives” to the dominant software (paras. 651, 
652).
The CFI also conﬁ rmed the Commission’s ﬁ ndings that the disclosure of 
the interoperability information to competitors would not have allowed other 
software suppliers to “clone” Microsoft’s own server OS, due to the limited 
nature of the protocols and to the lack of any commercial incentive to “repli-
cate” the dominant software. The Court held that, once having obtained the 
necessary protocols, Microsoft’s competitors would “have no other choice if 
they [wished] … to maintain a proﬁ table presence on the market, than to dif-
ferentiate their products from Microsoft’s products ….” (paras. 657, 658).
In relation to the condition that the refusal must be such as to exclude all 
competition from a secondary market, the applicant had argued that the Com-
mission had applied a wrong test in assessing whether this requirement had 
been met. According to Microsoft, the Commission had erred in law by prov-
ing only a “risk” that competition on the secondary market for the supply of 
work group server OS would have been eliminated and, instead, should have 
been required to prove the existence of a “high probability” that competition 
on that market be eliminated as a result of its refusal to grant an IP licence 
(paras. 437–439). However, the CFI rejected this plea as being only “one of 
terminology” and held that the Commission had been entitled to intervene 
“before the elimination of competition on the work group server OS had be-
come a reality”; it emphasized that, due the “network effects” characterizing 
the market, the elimination of any remaining constraints on Microsoft would 
have been “difﬁ cult to reverse” (paras. 519, 561, 562). 
On that basis, the CFI found that the conclusions reached in the Decision 
were correct and had been conﬁ rmed by the evidence. The Court took the view 
43. Cf. Opinion of A.G. Tizzano, para 62 in IMS Health, supra note 11; see also paras. 53–56 
of the judgment in IMS Health.
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that the analysis of the development of the market shares of the applicant and 
of its competitors indicated that the refusal to make available the necessary 
interconnection protocols to manufacture compatible server OS had resulted 
in the “competitors’ products [being] conﬁ ned to marginal positions or even 
made unproﬁ table.” Any remaining competition was barely signiﬁ cant and did 
not therefore constitute a “credible threat” to Microsoft’s position on that mar-
ket. (See paras. 593–594)
Finally, the CFI examined the Commission’s ﬁ ndings as regards the ab-
sence of “objective justiﬁ cation” for Microsoft’s behaviour. Microsoft had ar-
gued that its refusal to disclose the interoperability information was justiﬁ ed 
since it constituted the legitimate expression of its exercise of its copyright 
over information which was “secret …, of great value … and … [contained] 
signiﬁ cant innovation.” The applicant had also criticized the “balancing test” 
adopted by the Commission for the refusal to license and had argued that its 
application resulted in dominant undertakings having less incentive to inno-
vate since they could be required to “share the fruits of their efforts with their 
competitors” at some point in the future (paras. 666, 667, 670).
The Court, however, took the different view that the sole fact that the proto-
cols were covered by copyright could not represent an objective justiﬁ cation 
for the denial to grant a licence. Despite acknowledging that “a simple refusal” 
even by a dominant undertaking to license IP rights to a third party did not 
constitute conduct prohibited by Article 82 EC Treaty, the Court held that to 
accept the applicant’s argument would be tantamount to denying outright the 
application of the exception recognized by the ECJ in its Magill44 and IMS 
Health45 judgments (paras. 690, 691). 
The Court also rejected the applicant’s argument that the Commission had 
applied an incorrect test to assess the nature of the conduct. It held that the 
Commission had considered whether, in the exceptional circumstance of the 
case, the forced disclosure of the interconnection protocols could have had a 
negative impact on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate and had correctly found 
that the disclosure of that information, a common practice in the industry, had 
had no detrimental impact on the supplier’s drive to technical development 
(paras. 696, 702, 710). The Court agreed with the Commission that, quite to 
the contrary, such disclosure allowed the undertakings concerned to improve 
the quality and attractiveness of their products and thus concluded, on the 
merits, that Microsoft had not established any “objective justiﬁ cation” for its 
refusal to license the protocols (para 711).
44. RTE and ITP, supra note 39.
45. IMS Health, supra note 11.
Case T-201/04 875
The Microsoft judgment thus raises considerable issues with respect to the 
interpretation of the requirements laid down by the case law concerning 
whether the refusal to grant competitors a copyright licence covering “valu-
able” information constitutes an abuse of dominant position. 
3.4. Tying in “New Economy” markets: Old standards for innovative
 goods?
It is recalled, from section 2 above, that in the 2004 Decision, the Commission 
found that Microsoft’s practice of tying its WMP to Windows OS constituted 
an abuse of its dominant position on the PC OS market. It was stated that due 
to the presence of Windows on more than 90 % of PCs worldwide, WMP had 
enjoyed an “unrivalled” advantage over competing media players by becom-
ing as “ubiquitous” as the OS thanks to a “privileged channel” for its distribu-
tion.46 The decision also sought to establish that due to the “indirect network 
effects” characterizing this market, Microsoft had foreclosed any signiﬁ cant 
competition on the media player market since WMP was most likely to be-
come the “format of choice” for users and providers of media content to the 
detriment of competing products.47
The CFI took as its starting point on this issue the case law of the ECJ ac-
cording to which tying constitutes an abuse of a dominant position when, in 
the absence of an objective justiﬁ cation, four conditions are satisﬁ ed: ﬁ rst, 
there must be two separate products; second, the respondent undertaking must 
be dominant on the market for the tying product; third, it must not be possible 
for customers to obtain the tying product without the tied product (“coercion”); 
and ﬁ nally, the practice in question must be able to foreclose competition (pa-
ras. 842, 859).48 
As regards the “separate product” requirement, the CFI held that, although 
in principle it could not be excluded that the constant evolution characterizing 
high tech markets could result in “what initially appear to be separate products 
… being regarded as forming a single product, both from the technological 
aspect and from the aspect of the competition rules”, this was not the case for 
WMP. The Court emphasized that the two programmes fulﬁ lled different con-
sumers’ needs and that separate demand existed for OS without media func-
tionality. This ﬁ nding was conﬁ rmed by Microsoft’s commercial practices as 
well as by the presence of independent suppliers of media players, such as 
46. See Commission Decision, supra note 12, para 841.
47. Ibid.; see also judgment, para 846.
48. See e.g. Case C-53/92 P, Hilti v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-667; Case C-333/94 P, Tetra 
Pak v. Commission, [1996] ECR I-5921.
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Apple or RealNetworks (see paras. 913 924–925 926–927). The CFI also re-
jected the argument that the integration of a media player constituted a normal 
step in the evolution of PC OS or that it was justiﬁ ed on the basis of “com-
mercial usage”: not only had the applicant failed to provide convincing evi-
dence of the existence of “technical constraints” preventing it from seeking an 
alternative way of distributing the product, but it had also not demonstrated 
that this practice was common in the industry (paras. 936, 941). The second 
condition (dominance) was not contested.
Having regard to the third requirement, of “coercion”, the CFI conﬁ rmed 
that “the condition that the conclusion of contracts is made subject to accep-
tance of supplementary obligations” had already been fulﬁ lled on the sole 
ground that Windows was not available to customers without WMP due to the 
contractual practices adopted by Microsoft and the technical impossibility to 
uninstall WMP (paras. 961–963) . Nor was it signiﬁ cant that end users were 
not charged any extra price for the media player or were free to acquire com-
peting software fulﬁ lling the same function: according to the Court, neither 
Article 82 EC nor the case law required compulsion on customers to use the 
tied product or the imposition of an ad hoc charge for it (paras. 967–970).
With respect to the fourth requirement that tying must be capable of fore-
closing competition on the market for the tied product, the CFI noted that, by 
bundling WMP to the OS, the applicant, which was already dominant on the 
OS market, had achieved a level of penetration of the neighbouring market for 
media players which could not by matched by any other supplier and without 
having to engage in any “competition on the merits” (paras. 1038–1039). In 
fact, as a result of WMP being pre-installed, customers would be less likely to 
seek an alternative media player and exposed to a risk of “confusion” between 
the different media functionalities available (paras. 1041–1042). Moreover, 
original equipment manufacturers (hereinafter: “OEMs”) themselves, despite 
being in principle allowed to download other media software on the OS they 
installed, would not use that opportunity due to the costs involved and the fact 
that the machines would be deprived of signiﬁ cant hard disk space just to pro-
vide a programme performing the same functions as the preinstalled one, 
which could not be removed (paras. 1044–1045).
The CFI also conﬁ rmed the Commission’s conclusions that other methods 
to acquire competing software, such as downloading from the Internet or pur-
chasing in addition to the Microsoft package, did not constitute viable alterna-
tives to pre-installation in view of the uncertainties and the additional costs 
associated with their acquisition. It was therefore concluded that by tying 
WMP to its PC OS, Microsoft had abused its dominant position on the OS 
market since that practice had conferred on WMP an “unparalleled advantage” 
in its distribution as a result of which the tied product had become as ubiqui-
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tous as Windows and without competing with alternative software on grounds 
of quality (paras. 1053–1058).
Thereafter, the CFI examined whether the economic theory elaborated by 
the Commission justiﬁ ed the conclusion that the market had been foreclosed. 
As was already explained above, the markets for the supply of software are 
characterized by a trend toward “tipping” in favour of a speciﬁ c programme: 
in other words, the market share of the supplier of a speciﬁ c format is destined 
to increase as a result of the circumstance that the attractiveness of that pro-
gramme grows with the number of its users.49 The Commission, therefore, 
sought to establish that due to that “positive feedback effect” WMP would 
have eventually become the “standard of choice” of both users and media 
content providers.50
The CFI found that these ﬁ ndings were correct in the light of the evidence 
on which they had been based. It took the view that “the percentages of instal-
lation and use of media players” indicated a trend for media content providers 
to adopt WMP as their standard for the development of their products, since 
that would have allow them “to reach the great majority of client PC users”, 
and thus would eventually “entrench” that format as the “standard of choice” 
in the industry. The Court also pointed out that the costs associated to the 
adoption of alternative encoding formats constituted a signiﬁ cant deterrent for 
media content providers against producing content in different standards. Ac-
cordingly, it was concluded that the Commission had correctly established 
that, as a result of the tying, Microsoft’s dominant position would have been 
strengthened through methods other than competition “on the merits”, and 
thus contrary to Article 82 EC. (See paras. 1061–1070)
With respect to “objective justiﬁ cation”, the CFI held that the alleged ad-
vantages of tying did not fulﬁ l that condition. Although it could not be ex-
cluded that the “de facto standardisation” arising from the tying could beneﬁ t 
software developers and media content providers, due to the uniform presence 
of WMP on more than 90 percent of PCs worldwide, it was, according to the 
Court, most likely to lead to the foreclosure of the relevant market (paras. 
1146, 1151). The practice could not even be regarded as indispensable for 
OEMs to provide the media functionality required by Microsoft’s users, be-
cause that software could equally be supplied by Microsoft “on an indepen-
dent basis” (para 1156). 
49. Supra, section 3.2, at note 31 and accompanying text. See e.g. In re: Microsoft Corpora-
tion Antitrust Litigation – Sun Microsystem Inc v. Microsoft, 333 F. 3rd 517, per curiam, p. 521, 
note 1.
50. Commission decision, supra note 12, para 882.
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Finally, the CFI rejected the plea that by obliging it to offer version of Win-
dows without WMP alongside the “integrated” one, Microsoft’s economic 
freedom to exploit its unique business model had been unduly restricted. The 
Court stated that the Commission had only taken objection to the circumstance 
that Microsoft did not offer an additional, “unbundled” version of Windows 
and that, accordingly, the applicant remained free to offer a version of the OS 
to which WMP was tied, according to its business model (paras. 1149–1150). 
It added that the applicant had failed to adduce sufﬁ cient evidence that harm-
ful consequences, especially for users, arose from the alleged “fragmentation” 
of Windows and pointed out that, to the contrary, it had been possible to “un-
bundle” WMP from Windows without affecting the integrity of the OS (para 
1165).
The above summary illustrates that although the CFI took as its starting 
point of its reasoning the established case law,51 its interpretation of some of 
the requirements for abusive tying gives rise to controversial issues. Perhaps 
most importantly, the Court’s conclusions seem to suggest that the existing 
principles may not be entirely suitable to the competition issues arising in 
high-tech markets.52 These questions will be addressed in the following sec-
tions.
4. Comment
4.1. The CFI’s Microsoft judgment: A more lenient approach to refusals to
 license?
As was shown above,53 the CFI, despite recognizing that interoperability is 
essentially a matter of degree, preferred a wide interpretation of that concept 
to allow the “seamless integration” between Microsoft work group server OS 
and competing software, as a result of which, to ensure effective competition 
on the work group server market, non-Windows operated machines should be 
able to act both as client and as domain controller in the communication with-
in and between networks.54 However, it could be argued that this notion of the 
degree of interoperability appears to be, at least in part, inconsistent with pre-
vious practice. In 1984, the Commission, in the IBM Undertaking concerning 
51. Hilti supra note 48; Tetra Pak, supra note 48.
52. Cf. US v. Microsoft Corp, DC Court of Appeals, 147 F. 3d 935, per curiam, pp. 948–
949.
53. Supra, section 3.3, at note 40 and accompanying text.
54. See Commission decision, supra note 12, paras. 572, 665, 692–694.
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System 370,55 imposed a duty on the investigated company to license interface 
information to competing suppliers of hardware and software. Nevertheless, 
that duty was limited only to those protocols which were necessary to manu-
facture “compatible products” to the new OS, namely, software and hardware 
which could be “attached” to, and interact with, machines operated by System 
370.56 By contrast, Microsoft appears to have gone a step further by advocating 
an obligation to disclose all the interconnection protocols that are necessary to 
ensure “full interoperability” between work group servers operated by Micro-
soft and non-Microsoft OS and especially to allow non-Microsoft operated 
machines to act as “domain controllers” as well as “clients” in the context of 
the Microsoft architecture.57 
It has been argued that the solution proposed by the Commission and now 
approved by the Court and accepted by Microsoft, despite stopping short of 
obliging the dominant company to disclose its source code, could de facto al-
low Microsoft’s competitors to manufacture software which perfectly emu-
lates the dominant one58 and eventually stiﬂ e, rather than encourage innova-
tion.59 
As was brieﬂ y explained above,60 high tech markets are characterized by 
“network effects”: since computer programmes generally, and OS in particu-
lar, by their very nature are designed to work “in partnership” with other soft-
ware or hardware, their value is destined to increase along with the number of 
users that choose them Consequently, end users, on the one hand, will exhibit 
a stronger preference for “established” software and installers, on the other 
hand, will channel their resources in supplying programmes that have an es-
tablished “customer installed base”. Also, each OS is designed to interact with 
customers through a speciﬁ c interface. Consequently, each user will invest 
time and often resources to learn and train others in how to use it and, once 
they have acquired that knowledge, they will consider switching to an alterna-
tive OS “irrational” in consideration of the sunk costs they have borne in the 
process. In the light of the above, it has been suggested that high technology 
markets are very likely to be characterized by a trend toward “tipping” in fa-
vour of the emergence of a single product, which will come to dominate the 
55. IBM (System 370), see (1984) EC Competition Policy Newsletter, 94–95.
56. Inter alia, Jones and Sufrin, EC Competition Law: text, cases and materials, 2nd ed. 
(2005, OUP), p. 512.
57. Judgment, para 237.
58. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13, at 551.
59. Id., p. 552. See Press Release MEMO 07/359, available at: europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/359&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui
Language=en. 
60. Supra, section 3.2, at note 29 and accompanying text.
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market for at least one generation and, consequently, in a race for the market 
rather than in competitors striving to win over each other in the market.
Some authors argued that these trends could result in signiﬁ cant beneﬁ ts for 
consumers because, until the emergence of a new “de facto industry standard”, 
the market will be characterized by fast paced innovation and strong competi-
tion between suppliers who strive to manufacture the next “best software”. 
Furthermore, once that “standard” has become established, consumer welfare 
is likely to be enhanced by the standard’s widespread presence and the result-
ing ability of users to interconnect with a growing customers’ base.61 Other 
commentators, however, pointed out that although innovation in highly tech-
nological industries should be protected and encouraged, technological ad-
vancement and the resulting consumer welfare can only be safeguarded “by 
preserving the competitive process in the long run”.62 Accordingly, it was ar-
gued that especially when a dominant ﬁ rm controls “the last advancement in 
technology”, antitrust intervention may be justiﬁ ed to prevent behaviour liable 
to hamper future innovation and eventually consumers.63 
Concerns were raised at the possibility that dominant undertakings may 
“take advantage” of the otherwise welfare-enhancing network effects to pur-
sue strategies aimed at “locking in” existing users,64 such as by designing and 
promoting their “entrenched product” in such a way that the latter become 
“dependent” on it and then using its IP rights to prevent access to the market 
by would-be competitors. It could be argued that a refusal to grant an IP li-
cence concerning an “essential input” such as a “de facto industry standard”,65 
coupled with other forms of “loyalty inducing” conduct would probably con-
stitute an abuse of dominant position.66 
However, it must be acknowledged that the imposition on a dominant com-
pany of a duty to grant a licence for “essential inputs” covered by IP rights 
should be carefully assessed and, in any event, allowed only in exceptional 
circumstances67 to ensure that the appropriate balance is struck between re-
warding and promoting innovation and preserving competition.68 
Against this background, it is submitted that the emphasis placed by the CFI 
on “full interoperability”, on the one hand, is likely to boost the position of 
61. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13, at 526–529.
62. Montagnani, op. cit. supra note 29, at 630–631.
63. Ibid.
64. Ong, op. cit. supra note 11, at 221–222.
65. See e.g. IMS Health, supra note 11, para 49
66. See Case 237/98, VOLVO v. Erik Veng, [1988] ECR I-6211, paras. 8–9; for commentary, 
Ong, op. cit. supra note 11 at 216–217 and 221.
67. Ong, op. cit. supra note 11, 223.
68. Montagnani, op. cit. supra note 29, at 630–631.
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competing suppliers, who would be able to continue manufacturing compati-
ble products in the short term. On the other hand, however, by enabling Micro-
soft’s competitors to supply compatible products on the basis of the available 
interoperability information in the short term, it could result in consumers no 
longer be able to beneﬁ t from the “race for the market” since it could cause 
innovation to be chilled in the long term.69 
It could also be doubted whether this outcome is consistent with the existing 
case law of the ECJ. In the Bronner judgment, the Court of Justice held that a 
refusal to grant access to an “indispensable input would be abusive only if it 
“was likely to eliminate all competition on the part of [the] undertaking” seek-
ing to obtain that input and accordingly suggested that forced access should 
aim at protecting the existing degree of competition.70 By contrast, it is sub-
mitted that, by imposing on the applicant such a wide obligation to disclose 
interoperability information, the CFI appears to be concerned with safeguard-
ing and enhancing the position of Microsoft’s competitors on the market,71 a 
conclusion which, however, is not easy to reconcile with the rather restrictive 
interpretation adopted by the ECJ.72 
The CFI judgment also raises signiﬁ cant questions for the assessment of the 
requirement of “indispensability” of the information. It is remarkable that the 
decision did not address in detail the alternative solutions to the compulsory 
disclosure of the interconnection protocols, namely, whether the information 
already available to Microsoft’s competitors, the availability of open source 
speciﬁ cations and the possibility of “reverse engineering” could ensure a suf-
ﬁ cient degree of interoperability.73 It is recalled that, according to the ECJ case 
law, the requirement of “indispensability” is satisﬁ ed only once it is estab-
lished that there is “no actual or potential substitute for” the input access to 
which is sought.74 That condition was interpreted by Advocate General Jacobs 
in Bronner as meaning that a refusal would constitute abusive behaviour only 
if the party seeking access demonstrated that “duplication … is impossible or 
extremely difﬁ cult owing to physical, geographical or legal constraints or is 
highly undesirable for reasons of public policy” or when the costs associated 
with that duplication were such as “to deter any prudent undertaking from 
69. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13 at 528–529.
70. Bronner, supra note 39, para 38.
71. Hatzopoulos, “Refusal to deal: the EC Essential facilities doctrine”, in Amato and Ehler-
mann (Eds.), EC Competition Law: a critical assessment (2007: Oxford, Portland/Oregon, Hart 
Publishing), p. 348.
72. Bronner, supra note 39, para 38; for commentary, see Hatzopoulos, op. cit. supra note 
71, pp. 340–341.
73. Judgment, paras. 434–435. Cf. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13 at 537–541.
74. Bronner, supra note 39, para 41.
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entering the market”.75 Against this background, it is regrettable that the CFI 
did not address the question whether the interoperability information at the 
heart of the forced disclosure imposed on Microsoft was “indispensable” in 
the sense outlined in Bronner and instead limited its appraisal to the “valu-
able” nature of the protocols, both for the dominant company and for its com-
petitors.76 This approach would appear to have resulted in a departure, at least 
partial, from the restrained position hitherto adopted by the ECJ, according to 
which the ﬁ nancial costs, unless they were so high as to deter a “prudent un-
dertaking” from attempting to enter the market, would not in principle render 
an input “indispensable”.77 
 It is submitted that two factors appear to have played a considerable part in 
the CFI’s reasoning, namely the position of “near-monopoly” of Microsoft on 
the PC OS market and the “network effects” characterizing that market. It 
could be argued that, given the ubiquity of Windows, the “special responsibil-
ity” imposed by Article 82 EC on Microsoft would be far more extensive than 
in other circumstances and would therefore justify the wide obligation of dis-
closure provided by the decision.78 It could also be queried whether the rela-
tion of “dependency” existing between the dominant supplier and its custom-
ers79 due to the “entrenchment” of Windows as “industry standard”80 could 
warrant the forced disclosure of interoperability information to minimize the 
adverse consequences of the “lock in” effect and thus preserve any remaining 
competition.81 It is submitted that although these arguments may not be dis-
missed in principle, a closer analysis of the requirement of “indispensability” 
would have been necessary in any event in the light of the factual evidence and 
the existing principles.
However, the most controversial issues arise from the CFI’s interpretation 
of the concept of “new product”. In its judgment the CFI expressly recognized 
that this requirement could only be found in cases concerning the refusal to 
grant a licence for the use of inputs or information covered by IP rights.82 As 
the ECJ pointed out in the IMS Health preliminary ruling, the function of this 
condition is to allow for the “balancing of the interest in protection of the IP 
75. Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, paras. 65, 66.
76. Judgment, paras. 694, 702–703; see also paras. 383–85.
77. Bronner, supra note 39, Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, para 66.
78. Inter alia, Korah, Intellectual property rights and the EC competition rules (2006, Ox-
ford/Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing), p. 154; see e.g. mutatis mutandis, Case C-395/96 P, 
Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport SA and others v. Commission, [2000] ECR I-1365, paras. 
119–120.
79. Ong, op. cit. supra note 11, at 221.
80. Montagnani, op. cit. supra note 29, at 625.
81. Ong, op. cit. supra note 11, at 222.
82. Judgment, para 334.
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rights and the economic freedom of its owner against the interest in protection 
of free competition”.83 In that decision the ECJ held that “the latter could pre-
vail only where the refusal to grant a licence prevents the development of a 
secondary market to the detriment of consumers.”84 In the light of the above, 
it was concluded in IMS that the notion of “new product” should be read not 
as a “mere duplicate” of the products already available on the market, but 
rather as “new good or services not offered by the owner of the right and for 
which there is potential consumer demand.”85
The CFI in Microsoft, instead, appeared to take the different view that this 
requirement should be read as requiring “a limitation not only of production or 
markets, but also of technical development.”86 Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that Microsoft’s refusal to allow access to its interoperability protocols 
constituted conduct prohibited by Article 82 EC Treaty since it prevented the 
appearance of work group server OS that would be compatible with Micro-
soft’s own architecture to a degree sufﬁ cient as to constitute a “realistic” alter-
native to Microsoft’s own software for individual users, who would “other-
wise be ‘locked in’ a homogenous Windows solution.” The “appearance of a 
new product” was therefore not regarded as indispensable to determine wheth-
er the conduct of the dominant undertaking would be likely to cause prejudice 
to the welfare of consumers. Rather, the CFI held that a “limitation of techni-
cal development” would be sufﬁ cient to determine that prejudice.87 
However, the Court did not examine in detail whether the “upgrade” of 
available software, resulting from the efforts of the licensees, as advocated by 
the Commission, would be sufﬁ cient to constitute a “new product”. Instead it 
limited its scrutiny to accepting the Commission’s views that, once the in-
teroperability protocols had been disclosed, Microsoft’s competitors would be 
in a position to “offer work group server OS which, far from merely reproduc-
ing the Windows system … [would] be distinguished from those systems with 
respect to parameters which consumers consider important.”88
It could be argued that cases such as Magill dealt with very speciﬁ c factual 
circumstances and that the ECJ was especially concerned with stopping the 
appellants from reserving for themselves a monopoly position over a “second-
ary market”, by preventing the emergence of a completely novel good for 
83. IMS Health, supra note 11, para 48.
84. Ibid.
85. Id., para 49. See also Opinion of A.G. Tizzano, para 62.
86. Judgment, para 647.
87. Id., paras. 650, 647.
88. Id., para 656.
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which there was unsatisﬁ ed consumer demand.89 It is also recognized that, as 
the IMS Health preliminary ruling showed, there are inherent difﬁ culties in 
assessing what constitutes a “new product”.90 
 However, it must be acknowledged that the test applied by the CFI in Mi-
crosoft appears far less exacting than that enshrined in the ECJ case law. It is 
submitted that a more detailed assessment of whether the denial of access to 
the interoperability information resulted in impeding the emergence of novel 
products would have been necessary due to the peculiar characteristics of the 
dynamics of competition on the relevant market and especially of the need to 
avoid hampering the “welfare-enhancing” effects stemming from the “race for 
the market” characterizing this competitive process.91
Finally, with respect to the issue whether the refusal to disclose the interop-
erability information was objectively justiﬁ ed, it is acknowledged that this is 
perhaps the least developed condition of the IMS test. According to the Com-
mission 2005 Discussion Paper on Article 82, prima facie abusive conduct will 
not be caught by that prohibition only if there are “objective factors”, indepen-
dent from the dominant undertaking’s action, that render the conduct in ques-
tion necessary,92 if that behaviour constitutes a loss-minimizing reaction to 
competition from others or if it leads to the realisation of efﬁ ciencies which 
outweigh its negative impact on the relevant market.93 
 Having regard especially to the efﬁ ciency defence, according to the Com-
mission, four conditions must be satisﬁ ed: the conduct must result in, or be 
likely to lead to, efﬁ ciencies, it must be indispensable to attain them, consum-
ers must reap the beneﬁ ts of its effects and ﬁ nally, it must not be able to elim-
inate competition from a substantial part of the relevant market.94 However, 
even though similar considerations have played a part in the assessment of 
89. RTE and ITP, supra note 39, at paras. 53–54. See, inter alia, Ong, op. cit. supra note 11 
at 219–220.
90. Inter alia, Hatzopoulos, op. cit. supra note 71, p. 354.
91. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13 at 528–529.
92. Commission, DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 EC 
Treaty to exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, available at: ec.europa.eu/comm/com-
petition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf (hereinafter: Article 82 Discussion Paper), paras. 78, 
80. See e.g. Case 77/77, BP plc v. Commission, [1978] ECR 1513. For commentary, see Albors-
Llorens, “ The role of objective justiﬁ cation and efﬁ ciencies in the application of Article 82 EC”, 
44 CML Rev. (2007), 1727, and Rousseva, “Abuse of dominant position defences: objective 
justiﬁ cation and Article 82 in the era of Modernisation”, in Amato and Ehlermann, op. cit. supra 
note 71, p. 388.
93. Article 82 Discussion Paper, para 78; see also paras. 81–82, 84. See further Rousseva, 
op. cit. supra note 92, p. 404.
94. Article 82 Discussion Paper, para 84.
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other types of abuse, such as discount schemes,95 no judgment to date has rec-
ognized that exclusionary conduct could be objectively justiﬁ ed on these 
grounds.96 Consequently, it could be argued that the conclusions reached by 
the CFI in Microsoft are not surprising.97 It is recalled that, according to Mi-
crosoft, the refusal to grant a licence in respect to the copyright covering the 
interoperability protocols was “objectively justiﬁ ed” as a legitimate form of 
exercise of IP rights and a means to preserving Microsoft’s incentive to inno-
vate.98 However, the CFI rejected this argument and held that the mere circum-
stance that “the technology concerned was covered by IP rights” could not in 
itself constitute an “objective justiﬁ cation” for a refusal to license once the 
“exceptional circumstances necessary for a ﬁ nding of abuse of a dominant 
position had been satisﬁ ed”.99 
The Microsoft judgment therefore appears to suggest that, once all the other 
conditions for the ﬁ nding of a violation of Article 82 EC have been met, the 
protection of the interests of the holder of IP rights would not constitute a “suf-
ﬁ cient reason” to counterbalance the needs of free competition.100 “Something 
more” would thus seem to be required to refute the Commission’s conclusions 
that the refusal to grant a licence infringed Article 82 EC.101 However, accord-
ing to the CFI, the applicant had failed to provide sufﬁ cient evidence that its 
conduct would safeguard its incentive to innovate to such a degree as to out-
weigh the “exceptional circumstances” of the case. The Court endorsed the 
Commission’s ﬁ nding that the refusal in question concerned only limited in-
formation, whose disclosure was common practice in the industry, and was not 
therefore of such nature as to allow Microsoft’s competitors to “clone” the 
dominant OS.102 Although it could be argued that the CFI’s ﬁ ndings may have 
been partly justiﬁ ed by the generic pleas raised by the applicant, it is submitted 
that the Court’s approach may be open to question since it does not seem to 
take into full account the competition dynamics of the relevant market.
95. See, e.g. Case C-163/99, Portugal v. Commission, [2001] ECR I-2613, para 51: “… it is 
the very essence of a system of quantity discounts that larger purchasers of a product or users of 
a service enjoy lower average unit prices …”. See e.g. Rousseva, op. cit. supra note 92, p. 
407–408.
96. See e.g. Joined Cases T-191/98, 212–214/98, Atlantic Container Line AB and others v. 
Commission, [2003] ECR II-3275, paras. 1111–1112. See Rousseva, op. cit. supra note 92, p. 
414.
97. Judgment, para 670. See also Albors-Llorens, op. cit. supra note 92, at 1749–1750.
98. Supra, section 3.3; judgment, paras. 593–594 and 670. 
99. Judgment, paras. 689, 691.
100. See, mutatis mutandis, IMS Health, supra note 11, para 48.
101. Judgment, para 697.
102. Id., paras. 698, 708–710.
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It is suggested that, given the importance of innovation and R&D character-
izing high-tech industries, a closer consideration of the “efﬁ ciency enhancing” 
effects arising from Microsoft’s exercise of its IP rights covering interconnec-
tion protocols would have been appropriate.103 It is submitted that such an 
analysis, despite the difﬁ culties stemming from the balancing approach char-
acterizing it,104 would have reﬂ ected more adequately the economic reality and 
the positive implications for consumers arising from competition based not 
exclusively on the availability of a number of “similar” products, but rather on 
the emergence over time of a “de facto standard” designed to meet the con-
sumers’ needs and thus to “win the market” for a generation.105 
4.2. The implications of Microsoft for the assessment of abusive tying
Section 3.4 showed that the requirements of “coercion” and “foreclosure” of 
competition on the market for the tied product constituted “crunch points” in 
the light of the characteristics of the relevant market. In its Tetra Pak Interna-
tional judgment, the CFI had accepted that a clause having as its object to 
“make the sale of machines and cartons subject to accepting additional ser-
vices of a different type” could be considered to be abusive in itself, unless it 
could be “objectively justiﬁ ed” in relation to commercial usage.106 However, 
this plea was rejected in that case on the ground that, contrary to the appli-
cant’s submissions, there had been a long-standing and established practice of 
supply of “Tetra Pak compatible” cartons by independent producers and that, 
accordingly, tied sales of machinery and consumable packaging were not “the 
general rule” in that industry. The Court added that even if such “commercial 
usage” could have been established, it would not have been “sufﬁ cient to jus-
tify recourse to a system of tied sales by an undertaking in a dominant posi-
tion”, as a result of which competition is already weakened, since it would 
have deprived customers of the possibility to approach other suppliers, which 
were thus prevented from accessing the market.107 
 The CFI had also rejected Tetra Pak’s arguments that, in view of the techni-
cal characteristics of the “packaging system” and especially of the alleged 
need to protect public health, machinery and cartons did not constitute sepa-
rate products but rather, represented a new, “integrated” product. The Court 
103. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13 at 530–531.
104. Vezzoso, op. cit. supra note 13, at 386–387.
105. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13 at 530–531.
106. Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-755, paras. 135, 
136.
107. Tetra Pak, paras. 82, 137; see also Case 85/76, Hoffmann LaRoche v. Commission, 
[1979] ECR 461, paras. 89–90.
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took the different view that, “whatever the complexity of the aseptic ﬁ lling 
system”, it was not the task of dominant suppliers “to decide that, in order to 
satisfy requirements in the public interest, consumable products … constitute, 
with the machines with which they are intended to be used, an inseparable 
integrated system.” To allow dominant undertakings to engage in these prac-
tices would in fact amount to preventing independent suppliers, in the absence 
of any legal or technical obstacles, “from conducting an essential part of their 
business”.108
 Arguably, the CFI’s conclusions in Microsoft remain consistent with the 
principles enshrined in Tetra Pak.109 However, the Court did not address the 
question of whether the approach adopted by the ECJ in respect of “tradition-
al” types of tying is suitable to cases of “technological integration” such as 
that at issue. The position under the EC Treaty competition rules may, how-
ever, be contrasted with that in US antitrust law. In its Jefferson Parish judg-
ment, the Supreme Court of the US took the view that tying arrangements 
created “an unacceptable risk of stiﬂ ing competition and therefore [were] un-
reasonable ‘per se’”,110 providing that certain conditions are met. First of all, 
the arrangement must concern two or more products that “may be purchased 
separately in a competitive market” and, as a result, competing suppliers are 
deprived of the freedom to sell “either the entire package or its several parts.”111 
Second, it must be established that the seller, through the arrangement, is ex-
ploiting “its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase 
of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all or might have pre-
ferred to purchase elsewhere ….”112 Consequently, once it is proven that “the 
existence of forcing is probable”, the arrangement will be found to infringe 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act without the need to enquire into its effects.113 
However, in later judgments, the US Courts demonstrated a certain willing-
ness to adopt a more relaxed approach in speciﬁ c circumstances. In the IBM 
decision, the District Court for New Jersey took the view that the “per se” rule 
would not apply to prohibit the sale of the tying with the tied product when the 
latter “is required … as a pre-requisite for practical and effective use of the 
tying product.”114 The District Court acknowledged that the supply of “a sys-
108. Tetra Pak, paras. 79–84.
109. See judgment, paras. 859–860.
110. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 et al. v. Hyde, 466 US 2, 104 S. Ct. 1551, at p. 
1556.
111. Id., p. 1558.
112. Ibid.
113. Id., p. 1560.
114. Innovation Data Processing v. IBM, (1984) 585 F. Suppl. 1470, at p. 1475.
888  Case law CML Rev. 2008 
tem of technologically interrelated products”115 would not amount to “per se” 
unlawful tying when “sufﬁ cient justiﬁ cation” existed for it in relation to cus-
tomers’ preferences and, most importantly, in relation to the technical charac-
teristics of the product, but would have to be subject to a “rule of reason” ap-
praisal. Accordingly it was held on the merits that IBM, in view of the features 
of the software in question and its function vis-à-vis the hard disk drive to 
which it had been tied, had been “justiﬁ ed in offering only an integrated ver-
sion … as a single product and at a single price”,116 provided that, however, 
each of the components was also available on a standalone basis. 
In the light of IBM, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held 
in US v. Microsoft,117 which concerned allegations of unlawful tying between 
Windows 95 OS and Windows Internet Explorer, that “genuine integration” 
between two hitherto distinct products would not amount to “per se” prohib-
ited tying, but rather constituted a lawful expression of “technological innova-
tion” provided that certain conditions were fulﬁ lled. In accordance with a “rule 
of reason” approach, the supplier would have to establish that it is offering an 
“integrated product”, namely: “A product that combines functionalities (which 
may also be marketed separately and operated together) in a way that offers 
advantages unavailable if the functionalities are bought separately and com-
bined by the purchaser.”118 As a result, it was held that whereas such a ﬁ nding 
should be excluded in cases “where the manufacture has done nothing more 
than to metaphorically ‘bolt’ two products together”, it should be upheld when 
the “integration … is beneﬁ cial when compared to a purchaser’s combination” 
and is therefore aimed at securing “some technologically beneﬁ cial result.”119 
In the light of these principles, the Court of Appeals found that the respondent 
had proved the existence of “facially plausible beneﬁ ts” stemming from its 
“integrated design”, as opposed to a mere combination between Windows OS 
and a standalone web browser, both in terms of increased ease of use and of 
enhanced quality and functionality of the OS as a whole. It was therefore con-
cluded that, on the merits, Microsoft had established a case of “genuine” inte-
gration between Windows 95 and Internet Explorer.120
In a separate opinion, Mr Justice Wald, partly dissenting, suggested that 
technological integration should be assessed in the light of a “balancing test” 
taking into account the “various efﬁ ciency gains” that could accrue to suppli-
ers as well as consumers as a result of the tie and the weight of the “indepen-
115. Id., p. 1476.
116. Ibid.
117. US v. Microsoft Corp, 147 F 3d 935.
118. Id., p. 948.
119. Id., pp. 949–950.
120. Id., pp. 951 and 952.
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dent evidence” that a separate market existed for each product. Consequently, 
to escape a ﬁ nding that the arrangement was prohibited under the Sherman 
Act, Microsoft should have established “substantial synergies” which com-
pelled OEMs to accept a new “integrated product that bridges those markets.” 
In Wald J’s view, such a test, far from “chilling innovation” in the software 
industry, would provide a “safe harbour” to those forms of integration consti-
tuting the expression of Microsoft’s freedom “to design such products and 
market their beneﬁ ts to OEMs such that OEMs overwhelmingly choose the 
new product”.121
The “balancing test” was, however, rejected by the majority of the Court as 
being “not feasible in any predictable or useful way” due to the inability of 
judicial authorities to “evaluate the beneﬁ ts of high-tech product design”. The 
Court held that the position adopted in the separate opinion was destined “to 
thwart Microsoft’s legitimate desire to continue to integrate products” and 
thus would eventually dampen its drive to innovation by requiring it “to coun-
terbalance with evidence courts are not equipped to evaluate.”122 
The “rule of reason” approach to cases of technological integration was 
later reafﬁ rmed by the same court in its other 2001 Microsoft judgment.123 In 
that decision, the Court took the view that the application of a “per se” rule to 
tying, established in the Jefferson Parish case,124 would not be appropriate to 
tying arrangements occurring in “novel” markets, such as that for the supply 
of computer software. 125 The Court of Appeals found that there was a high risk 
that this approach could lead to “inaccurate results” in cases such as that at 
issue and eventually “stunt valuable innovation”. It was held that the integra-
tion of new functionalities on an existing “platform” was common in the in-
dustry and could, in such a “pervasively innovative” market, lead to efﬁ cien-
cies that had not hitherto been evaluated by the Courts.126 Consequently, the 
District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the application of a “per se” rule 
to the case at hand could risk stiﬂ ing the creation of efﬁ ciencies that are “com-
mon in technologically dynamic markets where product development is espe-
cially unlikely to follow an easily foreseen linear pattern”, such as that for 
“platform software”. The Court, instead, preferred to adopt a “rule of reason” 
approach, which, in its view, would grant “the ﬁ rst mover an opportunity to 
demonstrate that an efﬁ ciency gain” stemming from its practice could counter-
121. Id., per Mr J Wald, partly concurring, partly dissenting Opinion, p. 958–959.
122. Id., per curiam, pp. 952–953.
123. US v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34.
124. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 et al. v. Hyde, 466 US 2, 104 S. Ct. 1551 at 
1556.
125. US v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 at 90–91.
126. Id., pp. 92–93.
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balance any negative effects caused by the limitation on the freedom of choice 
enjoyed by the consumer and should therefore be allowed.127
Due to the limits of this case note, it is not possible to comment any further 
on the approach adopted by the US Courts as regards technological integration 
and the application of the Sherman Act to these cases of tying. However, the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ judgment could be interpreted as sug-
gesting a more “benevolent”, “deferential” attitude in the assessment of choic-
es of technological design involving the integration of two distinct, albeit 
complementary, products, which would allow to evaluate the beneﬁ ts accruing 
to consumers as a result of that integration.128 On that basis, commentators 
argued that any obligation to “unbundle” software previously offered as part 
of a “whole” platform should be assessed carefully to avoid prejudicing in-
novation “by restraining functionalities of adjacent markets from being inte-
grated in a sole product.”129
Against this background, it is regrettable that the CFI did not consider 
whether the legal principles governing “classic” examples of tying constituted 
a suitable standard for the assessment of cases of technological integration 
such as in Microsoft. Instead, by embracing a restrictive test which is close to 
the “per se” rule rejected by some of the US courts, the Court has imposed an 
“almost insurmountable burden” on a dominant company wishing to provide 
an objective justiﬁ cation for the offer of new functionalities integrated into a 
main “platform”,130 without taking fully into account the needs of innovation 
on high-tech markets. 
With respect to the requirement of coercion, it was noted in section 3.4 that 
the CFI relied almost entirely on the fact that Microsoft did not offer a version 
of Windows without the media player facility as a ground to establish the in-
ability of customers, through the medium of the OEMs, to obtain the two 
products separately.131 The Court declined to consider the circumstance that 
single users could obtain and install alternative media players which could be 
used on Microsoft operated machines as evidence of the absence of that 
“coercion”.132 However, it could be doubted that this approach would be ap-
127. Id. p. 92 and pp. 94–95.
128. US v. Microsoft Corp, 147 F 3d 935, pp. 949–950; also, US v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 
pp. 96–97. For commentary, see, inter alia, Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13 at 561–
562.
129. US v. Microsoft Corp, 147 F 3d 935, per curiam, p. 952. For commentary, see, inter 
alia, Montagnani, op. cit. supra note 29, at 641.
130. Evans and Padilla, “Tying under Article 82 and the Microsoft decision”, 27 W. Comp. 
(2004), 503 at 510. See also, mutatis mutandis, Albors-Llorens, op. cit. supra note 92, at 1759–
1760.
131. Judgment, paras. 961–963. 
132. Id., paras. 978–979.
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propriate to the circumstances of the Microsoft case. It is recalled that in the 
Hilti decision the Commission had considered as abusive the dominant com-
pany’s policy of reduction of discounts for customers who preferred to pur-
chase nails separated from the cartridges necessary to operate the primary 
product on the ground that it had deprived the customer of any choice with 
respect to the source of the nails by denying her access to a signiﬁ cant ﬁ nan-
cial advantage which it had reserved to customers willing to be “tied” to it for 
the purchase of all consumables.133 In the light of Hilti, it was suggested that 
the proper test to assess whether a practice of tying – in this case, a “ﬁ nancial 
tie” – constituted abusive behaviour under Article 82 EC should focus on the 
extent to which the conduct of the dominant company allowed customers “a 
meaningful commercial choice to buy the products separately”.134
Although Microsoft had not offered an “unbundled” version of Windows to 
customers, the evidence before the Commission and the Court indicated that 
single users could download standalone media players, such as iTunes and 
RealPlayer, on Microsoft operated machines and were not placed at a ﬁ nancial 
or technical disadvantage as a result of the tie, since WMP was provided free 
of charge as one of the features of Windows.135 Moreover, users could opt for 
different software without adversely affecting any of the functionalities of the 
main OS or indeed the working of the chosen media player.136 It is accordingly 
open to question whether the mere presence of WMP on all Microsoft-operat-
ed machines amounted to coercion for the purposes of Article 82 EC, since it 
did not affect the freedom of individual users to obtain an alternative and com-
peting media player, unlike in “classic” tying cases.
With respect to the requirement of “foreclosure”, according to the CFI in 
Tetra Pak, tied sales will constitute an abuse of a dominant position when they 
result in other suppliers being denied access to the tied product market result-
ing from the restriction placed on the freedom of their customers to seek 
sources of supplies other than the dominant undertaking.137 As was stated in 
section 3.4 above, according to the CFI, given the ubiquity of Windows, WMP 
would have enjoyed an unparalleled advantage over competing software which 
133. Commission Decision of 22 Dec. 1987, Hilti/Euroﬁ x, Bauco, O.J. 1988, L 65/19, paras. 
75 and 80.
134. Dolmans and Graf, “Analysis of tying under article 82: the Commission’s Microsoft 
decision in perspective”, 27 W. Comp. (2004), 225 at 231.
135. See e.g. Commission decision, supra, note 12, paras. 830–831, 955, 960.
136. See e.g. judgment, para 951.
137. Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak International v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-755, paras. 137, 
140. For a discussion of the approach adopted by the Commission see the Staff Discussion Paper 
on the application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses, above, note 203, paras. 188–189, 196–
199.
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could not be counterbalanced by any beneﬁ ts stemming from the improved 
functionalities or more efﬁ cient distribution and, consequently, would have 
become the “format of choice” due to the behaviour of the OEMs, of Micro-
soft’s customers and of media content providers.138 
However, whether these foreclosing effects were such as to warrant the in-
tervention of the Commission is open to question. It is submitted that the avail-
ability of competing media players, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, 
the circumstance that in markets for the supply of highly technological prod-
ucts competition appears to be a contest “for the market” rather than “in the 
market”, could be taken as suggesting that no signiﬁ cant harmful effects would 
result for consumers. Commentators added that not only do end users remain 
able to obtain and use competing media players, but they could also beneﬁ t 
from the standardization resulting from the establishment of a new “industry 
standard” and from the “innovation-fuelled” competition characterizing a new 
“race for the market”.139 As was explained earlier,140 in the software market, 
due to the existence of network effects, the customers who adopt the dominant 
OS as their “interface of choice” are likely to gain an advantage from their 
ability to communicate and interact with an increasingly extensive number of 
other users.141 In addition, the circumstance that due to the “entrenchment” of 
that software competing suppliers are likely to concentrate their efforts in de-
veloping different, innovative products with a view of threatening the leader-
ship of the “de facto standard” is going to encourage the emergence of better 
quality software, for the beneﬁ t of both media content providers and end us-
ers.142
Finally, it is argued that the case offered a “golden opportunity” to the CFI 
to provide clearer guidance on the extent to which efﬁ ciency beneﬁ ts stem-
ming from tying, especially because it enabled the dominant company to offer 
an innovative “integrated platform” to its customers, could constitute an ob-
jective justiﬁ cation for the behaviour at issue.143 The Court, instead, empha-
sized Microsoft’s near monopoly on the PC OS market and held that any re-
sulting beneﬁ cial effects for customers would have been outweighed by the 
unparalleled advantage in market penetration enjoyed by WMP due to the tie 
and its standardization as the “format of choice” for both users and media 
138. Judgment, paras. 1054, 1057–1058, 1061. Supra, section 3.4.
139. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13, at 564.
140. Supra, section 3.2.
141. See, inter alia, Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13 at 526–528; also, Montag-
nani, op. cit. supra note 29, at 625–626.
142. E.g. Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13, 528–529; Montagnani, op. cit. supra 
note 29, at 630.
143. Judgment, para 1110.
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content providers.144 Although it is acknowledged that Microsoft’s super-dom-
inance probably constituted the principal motive at the basis of the CFI judg-
ment, whether dismissing outright the claim of “objective justiﬁ cation” put 
forward by the applicant was entirely appropriate is open to question, espe-
cially in the light of the dynamics characterizing high-tech markets. 
Furthermore, the views adopted by some of the US courts in cases of tech-
nological integration demonstrate an increasing awareness of the need to avoid 
stiﬂ ing development by preventing even companies in a position of monopoly 
from adopting innovative business models.145 It is submitted that the “narrow 
and deferential” approach adopted by the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals in US v. Microsoft, as a result of which an antitrust violation is likely to 
be found only in cases in which the tying would not yield any “technologi-
cally beneﬁ cial results”, would have been preferable since it would have taken 
into fuller consideration the developmental needs of innovation driven mar-
kets such as that for PC OS and other PC applications.146
It is therefore concluded that the position adopted by the CFI, while it may 
be consistent with the existing case law governing “classical ties”, appears 
somewhat short-sighted since it does not sufﬁ ciently take into account the 
competition dynamics of the relevant market and especially the circumstance 
that in high tech industries there is a strong trend toward the emergence of 
“products … based on technological integration of new features”,147 which 
should therefore warrant a more “realistic” and ﬂ exible attitude to those forms 
of conduct.
4.3. Conclusions: how “special” is the responsibility of dominant
 companies in high tech markets?
The analysis conducted in the previous sections illustrated how the Microsoft 
judgment leaves open signiﬁ cant questions on the role of enforcement of the 
competition rules in New Economy markets and on the scope of the “special 
responsibility” imposed by Article 82 EC on dominant undertakings. It was 
argued that the CFI decision appears to have signiﬁ cantly changed the ap-
proach to refusals to deal and especially to grant IP licences covering propri-
etary information, by de facto “downgrading” some of the requirements of the 
test enshrined in the existing case law from “necessary” to merely “sufﬁ cient” 
144. Id., para 1151.
145. See, inter alia, Pardolesi and Renda, op. cit. supra note 13, at 561. Cf. Vezzoso, op. cit. 
supra note 13, at 388–390.
146. US v. Microsoft Corp, 147 F 3d, 935, at pp. 950, 951. See also US v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 
34, pp. 96–97.
147. Evans and Padilla, op. cit. supra note 131 at 512.
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conditions for the ﬁ nding of an abuse of dominant position. Having regard to 
the tying of WMP with Windows, it was argued that the rather strained inter-
pretation given by the Court to the concepts of “coercion” reﬂ ects the inability 
of the principles governing “classic” cases of tying to “cope” with the techno-
logical integration characterizing highly innovative industries, which, by its 
very nature, could warrant a more benevolent attitude on the part of antitrust 
enforcers. 
Accordingly, while Microsoft can be read as the response of EU competi-
tion policy to the behaviour of a “super-dominant” company in an industry 
characterized by ad hoc competition dynamics, it is likely to have profound 
implications for the future interpretation of Article 82 EC in general, whose 
directions cannot be easily predicted and which could be potentially detrimen-
tal both for the coherence vis-à-vis the existing legal principles and the effec-
tive and appropriate competition enforcement.
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